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Helms Boys, Inc. v. Brady, 297 S.E.2d 840 (W. Va. 1982).
Reddy v. Community Health Foundation of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1982).
Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co., No. 15594 (W. Va. July 7,
1983).
Perhaps the most rapid developments in employment law during the
survey period concerned the enforceability of covenants not to compete., The
view taken in early cases was that such covenants were generally en-
forceable if the restriction was reasonably necessary to protect the employer
and did not impose undue hardship on the employee.' The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, in seeking to strike a proper balance between the
interests of employers and employees, has built upon this early rule in its
most recent decisions. Accordingly, while the court has identified the range
of an employer's protectible interests, it has also recognized a tort remedy
for employees injured by unreasonably oppressive covenants.
In Helms Boys, Inc. v. Brady,' the court addressed the question of what
employer interests may properly be protected by the use of a covenant not to
compete. The defendant, Larry Brady, had entered into a written employ-
ment contract with Helms Boys, Inc., a retail furniture store. The contract
contained a restrictive covenant providing that, in the event his employment
was terminated, Brady could not work for a similar business within a 100-
mile radius for a period of five years. Brady resigned his position and began
working for another furniture store located only five miles from his former
employer. Helms Boys then filed an action to enforce the terms of the cove-
nant, and the trial court granted an appropriate injunction. On appeal, Brady
contended that the covenant was unreasonable and oppressive, and was
therefore void as contrary to public policy.
While reaffirming the general rule that restrictive covenants are en-
forceable, the court limited the kind of information and skills which could
legitimately be protected by that means. A noncompetition covenant is im-
proper where the only business assets acquired by an employee are "of a
general managerial nature," which was defined as encompassing such aspects
as supervising, merchandising, purchasing, and advertising.' The standard of
I The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has defined a convenant not to compete as "a
provision of an employment contract purporting to limit an employee's power, upon leaving his
contractual employment, to enter as a competitor into the market in which his former employer
does business or practices a trade or profession." Reddy v. Community Health Found. of Man, 298
S.E.2d 906, 909 n.1 (W. Va. 1982). Throughout this overview section, the terms "covenant not to
compete" and "noncompetition covenant" are used interchangeably.
2 0. Hommel Co. v. Fink, 115 W. Va. 686, 177 S.E. 619 (1934) (applying the early balancing
test).
3 297 S.E.2d 840 (W. Va. 1982).
' Id. at 843.
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review adopted was very favorable to the employee: any skills or information
possessed by the employee may be utilized except "under circumstances
where their use adverse to [the] employer would result in irreparable
injury."' In this case, the employer had failed to make an adequate showing of
protectible interest, and the covenant was invalid. The court's opinion also
suggested that in order to be protectible an employer's interest must be
"confidential or unique," in the nature of a trade secret or customer list.6 This
narrow view of the business interests which may be protected by a restric-
tive covenant has been adopted, in one form or another, by a majority of
jurisdictions.
7
The court's decision in Helms Boys laid the groundwork for Reddy v.
Community Health Foundation of Man.' Prior cases had been silent on the
question of allocating the burden of proof when an employee challenges the
reasonableness of a restrictive covenant. Reddy provided a suitable vehicle
for treating some of the procedural and evidentiary problems raised by the
Helms Boys standard.
In Reddy, a physician had entered into a contract with a non-profit health
care .foundation whereby he agreed to perform medical services for patients
at fixed rates payable by the foundation. A clause in the agreement provided
that if the employment relationship was terminated by either party, then the
physician could not practice medicine within thirty miles of the facility for a
period of three years. The doctor voluntarily quit his employment, and set up
a private practice in violation of the covenant. The foundation brought suit to
enjoin the physician from continuing to violate the covenant, and the trial
court granted injunctive relief. The physician appealed, attacking the cove-
nant as being overbroad.
The court, in an opinion by Justice Neely, recognized that the enforceabili-
ty of a noncompetition covenant turns on the interplay of three factors: (1) the
nature of the interest asserted by the employer, (2) the hardship visited upon
the employee, and (3) the potential injury to the public.' The formula offered
by the court to gauge the reasonableness of a covenant accords a respectful
Id. (quoting Slisz v. Munzenreider Corp., 411 N.E.2d 700, 704 (Ind. App. 1980)).
'Id. at 842.
See, e.g., Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 290 S.E.2d 882 (1982). The
Rosenbaum court, in reviewing a restrictive covenant, inquired whether it was "reasonable in the
sense that it [was] no greater than . . .necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate
business interest." Id. at 552, 290 S.E.2d at 884. In upholding the covenant, the court noted that
the employee had access to such confidential items as financial records, customer lists, and com-
pany pricing and bidding policies. Id. at 553, 290 S.E.2d at 885. See also Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 §§
70-79 (1955) (trade secrets and confidential information as legitimate employer interests); Annot.,
61 A.L.R.3d 397 §§ 37-41 (1975) (judicial modification of activities covered by restrictive
covenants).
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place to each factor. As a threshold matter, the court must inquire whether
the covenant is "unreasonable on its face." 10 The court stressed that this was
not a rigid test, observing that it operates only to invalidate those covenants
which are so oppressive as to tend "by in terrorem effect, to subjugate
employees unaware of the tentative nature of such a covenant .. .."I' This in-
itial review serves a dual function. First, it fosters the public policy of protec-
ting the interest of employees12 who would otherwise suffer the fate of their
inferior bargaining position. Second, it promotes judicial economy. As the
court remarked in this regard, "No court should trouble itself to rewrite an
inherently unreasonable covenant .. .
Once the court has determined that a covenant is not unreasonable on its
face, it may proceed to an analysis of the extent of the covenant's en-
forceability. The employer, as the scrivener, must bear the initial burden of
showing that he has a protectible interest. This determination is to be guided
by the criteria set forth in Helms Boys." If the employer makes a prima facie
showing, the covenant becomes presumptively enforceable in its entirety.
The burden then shifts to the employee to rebut the evidence offered by the
employer or to "demonstrate" that the covenant, as written, is overbroad and
ought to be judicially moulded." Additionally, the employee may offer
evidence that the asset in question belongs to him," either because it was his
when he entered the employment or because he has "paid" for it by receiving
a discounted rate of pay."
It is significant to note that the Reddy decision was a cautious first step
in a largely uncharted area. 8 Consequently, the analytic model offered by the
court was premised more on common sense and reason than on substantive
Io Id. at 915.
1, Id. at 916.
12 The court recognized the legitimate interest of an employee in mobility, and suggested
that a noncompetition covenant "is unenforceable if its true purpose is to repress the employee
and prevent him from leaving, rather than to protect the employer's business." Id. at 912. (quoting
Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 1014, 1057 (1975)).
" Id. at 915.
" The analysis under Helms Boys would involve application of the definition of protectible in-
terest and, presumably, the balancing test articulated by the Slisz court. Helms Boys, 297 S.E.2d
at 843.
" 298 S.E.2d at 916.
16 Id.
7 The court explained this economic aspect of the formula .s follows: In providing specialized
training for employees, an employer has made an investment in what the court termed "human
capital," giving rise to an interest in restraining the employees' mobility. An employee may, in ef-
fect, pay for this asset by accepting reduced wages during his novice period. A court reviewing a
restrictive covenant under such circumstances must determine whether the employer has fully
recouped his investment, thus making the asset in question the property of the employee. See
generally id. at 912-14.
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law. The policy considerations underlying this model were therefore simple
and fundamental:
(1) Courts should not sanction or enforce overly oppressive covenants;
(2) Employers should bear the initial burden of showing that they have in-
terests worthy of protection; and
(3) Once an employer has proved that he has a protectible interest, the
employee ought to be called upon to show why the employer should not
get the full benefit of his covenant.19
These rules provide judges with fair and meaningful guidelines in reviewing
noncompetition covenants. The Reddy decision will probably serve as a start-
ing point for future discussions of this issue in other jurisdictions. Ironically,
the continued utility of the Reddy analysis in this state has been called into
question by the newly christened tort of interference.
In the Helms Boys and Reddy cases, the court reviewed noncompetition
covenants within the framework provided by traditional contract law. Short-
ly thereafter, the question was addressed in terms of tort theory, and the
court's focus was shifted from the employer's asserted interest to the poten-
tial for injury to the employee's business expectancy. The rule fashioned by
the court is likely to have a marked impact on future employment relations.
In Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co.," the plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant bank. Her employment contract contained a cove-
nant stating that she could not work for a competitor within a radius of
twenty-five miles, for a period of two years after leaving her employment.
Torbett voluntarily quit her job and was offered a position with another
bank, provided she was not bound by the covenant in her prior contract. She
brought an action for damages and for a declaratory judgment to establish
that the covenant was unreasonable. The trial court, with the aid of an ad-
visory jury, found that the employer had not made a showing of a protectible
interest and awarded a sum of $35,000 for lost income.
In an opinion by Justice Harshbarger, the court first dealt with an ap-
parent procedural hurdle. Although an action for a declaratory judgment is a
proper means to test the enforceability of a restrictive covenant,21 p1ior cases
had held that claims for other relief could not be included irt the same com-
plaint as the declaratory action.' Citing the precedence of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court concluded that Rule 571 had broadened
I These policy considerations are implicit in the Reddy formula. Id. at 917.
No. 15594 (W. Va. July 7, 1983).
" Torbett, No. 15594, slip op. at 10 (citing Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 743 (1950)).
Tharp v. Tharp, 131 W. Va. 529, 48 S.E.2d 793 (1948).
Rule 57 provides in pertinent part:
The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory
1984]
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[
the relief available in declaratory actions as fixed by statute." Accordingly, a
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment may request such other relief as is
deemed appropriate, and the prior cases holding otherwise were overruled.25
Recognizing that the prayer for damages in the plaintiff's complaint fail-
ed to allege a breach of contract or to specify any tort committed, the
supreme court volunteered to identify the tort which may have been suffered
and to baptize it with a name. Placing reliance on several scholarly sources,"0
the court formally adopted the tort of intentional interference with prospec-
tive business relations into the common law of the state. The constituent
elements of the tort, as set forth by the court, include:
(1) the existence of a contractual or business relationship or expectancy;
(2) an intentional act of interference by a party outside that relationship or
expectancy;
(3) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained; and
(4) damages.
Briefly addressing the defense bar, the court noted that either justification
or privilege may be raised as an affirmative defense.
The future ramifications of this decision in the area of employment rela-
tions will undoubtedly be pronounced. As the court calmly observed: "We
understand that this opinion will severely curb [the] use of restrictive
covenants in employment contracts. A scrivener must ascertain whether his
covenant is sufficiently narrow to protect only legitimate business interests
in a reasonable fashion."' The import of the decision is clear: An employer
may include a restrictive covenant in an employment contract only at the risk
of exposing himself to potential liability.
But the decision has done more than that. It has left critical questions
unanswered. Is an employer subject to liability if his covenant, while protect-
ing a legitimate business interest, is overbroad? What is the proper role, if
any, of the doctrine of avoidable consequences? May an employer assert con-
relief in cases where it is appropriate. A party may demand declaratory relief or coer-
cive or both in one action. Further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be
granted in the declaratory action or upon petition to any court in which the declaratory
action might have been instituted.
W. VA. CODE § 55-13-8 (1981) provides in part:
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever
necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having
jurisdiction to grant the relief. (emphasis supplied).
No. 15594, at 12 (overruling syllabus point 5 of Tharp v. Tharp).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1965); 45 AM. JuR. 2d Interference §§ 1-65 (1965);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 129-30 (4th ed. 1971); Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 195 (1981); Annot., 5
A.L.R.4th 9 (1981); Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 1276 (1981).
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sent as an affirmative defense? The absence of any treatment of these
related issues suggests that the court, uncertain of the impact of its decision,
purposely reserved the right to monitor and reshape its infant rule on a case
by case basis. Another pressing question is to what extent has Torbett gut-
ted the carefully drawn analysis set out in Reddy?' And lastly, what will be
the socio-economic effects of the decision? While it is clear that the tort of in-
terference spawned by Torbett will have a serious impact, it is impossible to
say with certainty how it will affect the bargaining process or employee
mobility in the job market.
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 3
Cardwell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 301 S.E.2d 790 (W. Va.
1983).
Hall v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 303 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1983).
Estep v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 298 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va.
1982).
In deciding workers' compensation cases, the supreme court is guided by
the principle that our compensation statute should be liberally construed in
favor of claimants. 1 Recent decisions by the court have tended to
demonstrate the continued vitality of this rule. As a result of the reign of the
"liberality rule," the court has expanded the available bases of recovery for
workers and their dependents, and has attempted to ease the burden of proof
in establishing a worker's permanent disability.
In determining whether a claimant is entitled to an award for permanent
total disability, our workers' compensation law allows the commissioner to
consider the impact of the claimant's injury on his future employability.2 The
issues raised in Cardwell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r33 focus-
ed on a variety of evidentiary problems involved in proving a claimant's in-
ability to obtain work.
I In Torbett, the court cites syllabus points 1 through 5 of Reddy, including the analysis for
determining the enforceability of a noncompetition covenant. However, there are no guidelines of-
fered regarding the limits on this test which are necessitated by recognition of the tort of in-
terference.
1 The Legislature amended W. VA. CODE § 23-1-1 (1981), effective May 12, 1983, changing the
term "workmen's" to "workers' " throughout chapter 23. H.B. 1502 (passed February 11, 1983).
11 "Workmen's compensation statutes, being remedial, should be liberally construed in favor
of [the] claimants for workmen's compensation benefits." Johnson v. State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 624, 186 S.E.2d 771 (1972) (syllabus point 1 by the court).
2 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(n) (1981) provides:
A disability which renders the injured employee unable to engage in substantial gainful
activity requiring skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which
he has previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time
shall be considered in determining the issue of total disability.
' 301 S.E.2d 790 (W. Va. 1983).
1984]
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Jerry Cardwell suffered the loss of his right eye as a result of an explo-
sion in a coal mine. After an extensive investigation, the commissioner
awarded Cardwell a thirty-eight percent permanent partial disability-the
thirty-three percent statutory minimum for total loss of sight in one eye,3
plus an additional five percent for the residual effects of the injury. Cardwell
appealed this decision, claiming that his employer's refusal to rehire him
following the injury was persuasive evidence of his inability to get work.
Justice Harshbarger, writing for the majority, noted that a determina-
tion of disability involves a "blend of ingredients" including not only the ex-
tent of physical loss, but also the degree to which the injury impairs the
claimant's ability to obtain work in the future." The general rule articulated
by the court stated that "when permanent partial disability in the medical
sense combines with other factors such as age, education, and intelligence, to
make a person unemployable, he is entitled to a permanent total disability
award."3 6
The adoption of this standard has given rise to complex evidentiary pro-
blems. A question of first impression presented by the Cardwell case in-
volved who should bear the burden of proof regarding the availability of
work to the claimant. In this regard, the court relied heavily upon the able
discussion of this issue by Professor Larson." The rule set out by Larson, and
quoted approvingly by the court, may be summarized as follows. Where a
claimant's physical impairment combines with other factors to place him
prima facie in the "odd-lot" category," the employer bears the burden of
showing that suitable work is available to the claimant on a regular basis.
Conversely, where the physical injuries are not such as to render him ob-
viously unemployable, the claimant must bear the burden of proving that
work is unavailable.3 9
Additionally, the court accepted Cardwell's contention that his
employer's failure to rehire him was admissible as evidence of his inability to
obtain regular employment. Pointing to the existence of statutory incentives
to rehire injured employees,'" the court concluded that an employer's failure
to do so "may weigh heavily as proof of the [un]availability of work.'"1
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(f) (1981).
301 S.E.2d at 794.
36 Id. at 796.
A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.61 (1981).
' The term "odd-lot" is used by Professor Larson and the court to refer to an employee
whose physical debility has rendered him unemployable.
301 S.E.2d at 795-96 (quoting A. LARSON, supra note 36, § 57.61).
'o Specifically, the court cited the special "second injury fund," which encourages the hiring
of employees with pre-existing injuries by charging employers only for compensation resulting
from subsequent injuries. See infra notes 52 & 55 and accompanying text.
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The Cardwell decision indicated the court's willingness to develop flexi-
ble rules to deal with a vast array of factual situations. Moreover, the court
appeared to be sympathetic to the difficulty faced by a claimant in seeking to
prove the effects of an injury on his ability to compete in the labor market. If
similar evidentiary issues arise, the court will likely act to further ease the
claimant's burden of proof.
An employee's death resulting from self-inflicted injury is not compen-
sable under our workers' compensation law.42 As early as 1969, however, the
supreme court had indicated that a suicide may not always be embraced by
the term "self-inflicted injury" within the meaning of the statute." The ques-
tion which remained unanswered by the case law was what standard should
be applied in determining when a suicide is properly compensable.
In Hall v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r," the court was
squarely confronted with this issue. Jessie Hall, an employee with more than
thirty years of service at a coke facility, filed a claim for occupational
pneumoconiosis benefits. Only six days after the claim was filed Hall commit-
ted suicide. The claimant's widow thereafter filed a claim for dependent
benefits, which was denied by the commissioner. On appeal, Ms. Hall asserted
that there was sufficient causal relationship between the decedent's injury
and suicide to warrant compensation.
In its discussion, the court outlined three recognized standards used in
determining the compensability of a worker's suicide: (1) the Sponatski rule,
(2) the New York rule, and (3) the chain of causation rule.4" The Sponatski
rule, deriving its name from Sponatski's Case,"8 states that a suicide is com-
pensable only if it is the product of "an uncontrollable impulse or . . . a
delirium of frenzy 'without conscious volition to produce death ... . , ""I The
so-called New York rule originated in the case of Delinousha v. National
Biscuit Company,8 and allows death benefits if a suicide results from a condi-
tion of "brain derangement," or actual physical injury to the brain. The chain
of causation rule, presently adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, permits an
award of benefits if the suicide "was merely an act intervening between the
42 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
'1 In Staubs v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 153 W. Va. 337, 168 S.E.2d 730
(1969), an orchard worker committed suicide after prolonged exposure to various chemicals used
in spraying. The court reversed a compensation award made to the decedent's widow, holding that
the record made it clear that the death did not "occur in the course of and as the result of his
employment .... " 153 W. Va. at 347, 168 S.E.2d at 735. For this reason, the court did not reach
the issue of the applicable standard of review.
303 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1983).
,Id. at 728.
" 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915).
47 220 Mass. at 530, 108 N.E. at 468.
's 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431 (1928).
1984]
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injury and the death, and part of an unbroken chain of events from the injury
to the death .. .."49
Conceding that terms such as "delirium of frenzy" and "brain derange-
ment" are imprecise and outmoded, the court adopted the chain of causation
rule. The court also stated that this rule was more in accord with the
remedial purposes of the workers' compensation law.' As delineated by the
court, an employee's suicide is compensable under West Virginia Code Sec-
tion 23-4-1 if:
(1) the employee sustained an injury which arose in the course of and resulted
from covered employment;
(2) the employee would not have developed a mental disorder without the prior
injury;
(3) the employee would not have committed suicide without the mental
disorder 5'
Although prior case law had impliedly recognized the compensability of
some worker suicides, the lack of an authoritative standard to be applied had
resulted in much uncertainty. The Hall decision spoke directly to this issue,
and the rule adopted by the court was clearly the least demanding of the
recognized standards. The potential reach of the rule may be broader when
viewed in the context of cases recognizing psychological harm as "injury"
covered by the compensation statute.52 Even so, there is a counterweight pre-
sent in the Hall compensability test: The suicide must ultimately be traced to
an on-the-job injury, and the causal nexus between injury and death must
meet the rigorous "but for" test.
The second injury statute' provides that where an employee is per-
manently disabled as a result of successive injuries, the employer is liable
only for compensation attributable to the second injury. The sole issue raised
in Estep v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r" was whether this
statutory provision applied where the employee had suffered both injuries
while working for the same employer.
Virgil Estep was awarded a forty-five percent partial disability for oc-
cupational pneumoconiosis. When combined with a previous award, his total
percentage of disability equalled the statutory minimum for permanent total
disability.' The claimant appealed from an order of the Workmen's Compen-
" Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So.2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1949).
303 S.E.2d at 730.
Id. at 730-31.
Breeden v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 285 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1981).
W. VA. CODE § 23-3-1 (1981).
298 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1982).
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(d) (1981) provides that "[a] permanent disability of eighty-five percent
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sation Appeal Board denying him total disability status. In its brief, the
employer raised the statutory question.
In a brief opinion, the supreme court held that the second injury statute
applied in cases where both of the claimant's injuries were suffered at the
same place of employment. Justice McGraw, writing for the court, stated that
the purpose of the statute was to provide incentive to employers to hire in-
jured workers by charging them only for compensation resulting from the
second injury." The balance of the compensation would then be charged
against the special second injury fund. McGraw noted that this salutary
policy would be frustrated if the statute did not apply in circumstances such
as those in the Estep case. As the court commented: "Application of the sec-
ond injury statute here places all injured worker on the same footing regarding
the employer's compensation liability for subsequent injury resulting in
permanent total disability."57
III. DISMISSALS
State ex rel Perry v. Miller, 300 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1983).
State ex rel. Ash v. Randall, 301 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1983).
Recently, the court has dealt with an increasing number of cases regard-
ing the guidelines for employee dismissals and suspensions, especially in
light of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. 8 Two cases during
the survey period dealt with an additional factor not extensively treated in
prior analyses: society's interest in promoting the health and safety of
employees and the public-at-large.
The due process clause of both the federal and West Virginia constitu-
tions provides that no person shall "be deprived of... property, without due
process of law ... ."I' Both federal and state courts have construed this con-
stitutional mandate to require, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity for a
hearing before the deprivation." The question presented in State ex rel.
Perry v. Miller 1 was whether the due process notice and hearing re-
" This policy was recognized by the court in McClanahan v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 207 S.E.2d 184, 186 (W. Va. 1974): "The basic intent of the second injury statute is to en-
courage the hiring of the handicapped by not charging an employer for preexisting disabilities.
298 S.E.2d at 143.
See, e.g., Major v. DeFrench, 286 S.E.2d 688 (W. Va. 1982) (applying due process analysis to
the dismissal of a police officer).
" W. VA. CONST. art. HI, § 10. See also- U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
" See, e.g., Simpson v. Stanton, 119 W. Va. 235, 193 S.E. 64 (1934), where the court states:
"The office of notice is to afford an opportunity for hearing, and the two must necessarily go
together. There can be no due process of law without a fair and reasonable opportunity for a hear-
ing." 119 W. Va. at 240, 193 S.E. at 67. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (applying
notice and hearing requirements to pre-judgment seizure of property).
01 300 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1983).
1984]
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quirements applied to the temporary suspension of mine employees pending
an investigation of alleged mine safety violations.
The Perry case arose out of a mine disaster in which five coal miners
were killed as a result of an explosion. After an investigation by safety of-
ficials, five mine and assistant foremen were charged with violation of provi-
sions of the West Virginia Coal Mine Safety Laws. Jack Perry, a member of
the Board of Appeals of the State Department of Mines, brought this action
for a writ of mandamus to compel the department's director to suspend the
foremen pending the outcome of a formal hearing. The Director questioned
the propriety of the mandamus since he has no express statutory authority to
suspend employees. The mine foremen were permitted to intervene, and con-
tended that the requested suspension was violative of their procedural due
process rights.
In an opinion penned by Justice Miller, the court recognized an exception
to the general prehearing rule where overriding public safety concerns are
present. In support of its conclusion, the court cited a number of cases deal-
ing with analogous situations, such as the cessastion of operations for viola-
tion of surface mining legislation" and the revocation of a driver's license for
refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test.' The connecting thread in these
cases, according to the court, is the government's interest in protecting
public health and safety, which serves to justify the use of summary ad-
ministrative action." The West Virginia Legislature has specifically
established as the primary purpose of the Department of Mines "the protec-
tion of the safety and health of persons employed within or at the mines of
this state."65 The suspensions were thus proper, concluded the court, since
the employees' property rights yielded to the paramount government in-
terest.
The court also determined that the Director of the Department of Mines
possessed an implied power to suspend a mine official which stemmed from
his express authority to license."' The foregoing findings were then synthe-
sized to create the following rule:
[W]here an administrative agency is given the power to license in an area that
has a direct impact on the health or safety of the members of the public in-
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Anderson &
Anderson Contractors v. Latimer, 257 S.E.2d 878 (W. Va. 1979).
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
" Administrative action often assures the swiftness necessary to protect the public well-
being. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (permit-
ting administrative mining cessation orders as a legitimate means to promote the safety of mine
employees).
6 W. VA, CODE § 22-1-2 (1981).
300 S.E.2d at 627. In recognizing the Director's licensing authority, the court relied on W.
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cluding employees of a given industry, such agency possesses the power to
temporarily suspend such license without the necessity of holding a
presuspension hearing when such suspension is necessary for health or safety
reasons.
7
As a final matter, the court considered the appropriateness of a man-
damus as remedy in the case. Since the case raised issues "of a substantial
public policy nature," the court ruled that a mandamus was a proper mode of
relief. 8 However, since a suspension was found to be a discretionary act, the
court issued a moulded writ directing the Department of Mines to pro-
mulgate a regulation relating to temporary suspensions. 9
The Perry decision is an important addition to West Virginia's due pro-
cess jurisprudence. It serves to establish an informal balancing test to be us-
ed in determining when presuspension hearings are constitutionally required.
Moreover, the Perry court intimated in dictum that the same kind of analysis
would be employed where suspensions are based on the existence of
"emergency conditions" or other compelling public policy."
The court's decision in the Perry case provided a springboard for State
ex rel, Ash v. Randall."1 The questions raised in Ash involved statutory,
rather than constitutional, requirements for employee dismissals where
public health and safety concerns are present. At issue was whether a public
employee, entrusted with tasks affecting health and safety, may be dismissed
for receipt of psychiatric treatment if his condition poses a risk of harm to
the public.
The plaintiff, William Ash, was a plant operator at the municipal water
treatment facility in St. Albans, West Virginia. Ash was hospitalized for a
period of three weeks for psychiatric treatment. After his release, he was
dismissed from his position by the mayor who, after conducting a thorough
investigation, concluded that Ash could not responsibly carry out his duties.
When the mayor denied Ash's request to be reinstated, he instituted a man-
damus action to compel his reinstatement with back-pay. The trial court
found that Ash's dismissal was in violation of the state statutes protecting
the mentally ill,7 2 but refused to order the payment of back-wages. The par-
, Id. at 628.
See Smith v. State Bd. of Educ., 295 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1982) (recognizing the "substantial
public policy" exception for mandamus actions).
300 S.E.2d at 628-29.
0 The supreme court had held in. North v. Board of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411, 417 (W. Va.
1977), that "due process must generally be given before the deprivation occurs unless a compell-
ing public policy dictates otherwise." (emphasis supplied). In discussing this case in Perry, the
court construed "compelling public policy" to include both overriding public heath and safety con-
cerns and emergency conditions. 300 S.E.2d at 626.
" 301 S.E.2d 832 (M. Va. 1983).
72 W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9(a) (1980).
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ties filed cross appeals, and the cases were consolidated for oral argument
and decision.
In an opinion by Justice McHugh, the court qualified the cause of action
for discriminatory discharge originally recognized in Hurley v. Allied
Chemical Corp.73 The rule established by Hurley was that an employee has a
valid cause of action if he is dismissed "solely by reason of his receipt of ser-
vices for mental illness."' But the court, acknowledging that this rule was in-
adequate, added a new component to the Hurley test. In order to recover for
discriminatory discharge, the employee must make a sufficient showing that
he is otherwise qualified for the employment. In the language of the court, he
must demonstrate to the factfinder "that the mental illness would not impair
his or her ability to perform the duties of that employment."75
Turning to the facts of the Ash case, the court concluded that the plain-
tiff had failed to make a showing that he was "otherwise qualified" to per-
form his job responsibilities. A municipal official is authorized by statute to
discharge an employee whose physical or mental illness compromises his
ability to fulfill his obligations without injury to the public." Although the
court was "mindful of the need to protect a person who has a mental illness
and who seeks treatment for that illness," the rights of the public must also
be weighed in the balance.7 Since the record revealed that Ash's duties were
related to the public health and that his mental condition could adversely af-
fect his work performance, the court refused to second-guess the mayor's
decision to dismiss him.
The Ash decision is essentially an extension of the analysis adopted by
the court in Perry. The court appeared to apply a modified version of its
balancing test in weighing the rights of those afflicted with mental disorders
against the general welfare of society. Additionally, the adoption of the
"otherwise qualified" standard ensures that the factfinder will have at its
disposal adequate guidelines in deciding future discriminatory discharge
suits.78
IV. ARBITRATION
Barber v. Union Carbide Corp., 304 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. 1983).
In recent years, the supreme court has adopted a policy of encouraging
binding arbitration as a means of resolving disputes between sophisticated,
262 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1980).
7' W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9(a) (1980).
71 301 S.E.2d at 836.
7, Id. at 835.
7 Id.
7' For other cases dealing with dismissal and back pay, see the Administrative Law portion
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commercial parties. 9 As a consequence of this policy, the- court has expressed
a reluctance to review arbitration awards in the absence of an allegation of
fraud on the part of the arbitrator." The case of Barber v. Union Carbide
Corp." permitted the court to address two major issues in the area of arbitra-
tion law: the definition of "fraud," and the proper scope of judicial review in
arbitration cases.
Thomas Barber, an employee of Union Carbide Corporation, filed a claim
for total disability benefits under the terms of a pension agreement between
the corporation and Barber's union. When his claim was denied, Barber in-
voked the arbitration provision which provided for a physical examination of
the claimant by doctors chosen by each of the parties. The decision of the
physicians was that Barber did not meet the total disability requirements of
the plan. Barber then filed a civil action against the corporation alleging "con-
stuctive fraud" in the arbitration proceedings. The trial court granted Union
Carbide's motion for summary judgment, and Barber appealed.
Justice Neely, in the opinion for the court, rejected Barber's invitation to
broaden the scope of review of arbitration awards. The policy favoring the
use of bargained-for arbitration provisions fosters such goals as expediency,
economy, and flexibility.2 To permit judicial intrusion in the arbitration pro-
cess necessarily detracts from each of these objectives, and results in increas-
ed litigation. As the court remarked: "[W]here it [arbitration] is a mere
shadow-play prefiguring eventual court litigation it is a positive curse."'
Thus, where it appears to the trial court that the litigants are commerical
parties who knowingly bargained for an arbitration clause, no further inquiry
should be made as to the correctness of the arbitrator's decision in the
absence of fraud.'
As to the definition of fraud, the court stressed that sanctioning review
of anything more than actual fraud would embroil judges in matters outside
the judiciary's limited role. The term "fraud," the court remarked poignantly,
"means fraud, not constructive fraud, quasi-fraud or anything else
fraud-like."8'5 For the purpose of attacking an arbitration award, fraud was
defined narrowly as "willful, deliberate, malicious corruption emanating from
an intentional desire to defeat a known, legitimate claim.""8 Since the plaintiff
had failed to make a showing of actual fraud, the trial court was correct in
awarding a summary judgment in favor of the corporation.
" See, e.g., the explanation offered in Board of Educ. v. Miller, 236 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1977).
SId.
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While appearing at first blush to severely limit judicial review, the
Barber decision likewise points to several matters into which the court is
willing to inquire. Among these collateral inquiries, the most important is
perhaps whether the parties to the agreement are "knowledgeable commer-
cial parties," since the opinion suggests that they alone are immune from
judicial scrutiny. 7 Additionally, the court indicated its willingness to review
the procedure utilized by the arbitrator to determine whether it conforms
with the terms of the arbitration agreement.8 Finally, the relative bargain-
ing positions of the parties may also be considered in reviewing an
arbitrator's decision. The trial court is presumably authorized to set aside an
award if the arbitration clause was part of a contract of adhesion, or if use of
binding arbitration was not "proper under the totality of the commercial cir-
cumstances."89 In view of these caveats, it may be fair to say that the Barber
''rule" was effectively swallowed up by its exceptions.
V. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Belt v. Cole, 305 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1983).
Farmer v. Cole, 300 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam).
Gibson v. Rutledge, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982).
The supreme court has repeatedly held that "[u]nemployment compensa-
tion statutes, being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed to
achieve the benign purposes intended to the full extent thereof."' , In three
cases during the survey period, the court has dealt with questions touching
on the range of eligibility requirements. In each case, the right of claimants
to receive benefits under the provisions of the compensation statute has been
expanded.
Among the prerequisites for receiving unemployment compensation
benefits, a claimant must show that he has been "totally or partially
unemployed" for a waiting period of one week prior to the week for which he
claims benefits.91 The supreme court had previously held that a striking
worker is ineligible for benefits because he has not severed his employment
relationship. 2 Belt v. Cole 3 consisted of three cases94 consolidated on appeal
to allow the court to reassess its eligibility rule.
Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Miller, 236 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1977)).
8 Id.
89 Id.
9 Gibson v. Rutledge, 298 S.E.2d 137, 141 (W. Va. 1982) (quoting Davis v. Hix, 140 W. Va. 398,
84 S.E.2d 404 (1954)).
9' W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-1(4) (1981).
2 Pickens v. Kinder, 155 W. Va. 121, 181 S.E.2d 469 (1971).
93 305 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1983).
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Belt involved a question of statutory construction which did not require a
recitation of the underlying facts. In each of the three cases, the trial court
had denied benefits to striking employees in reliance on the case of Pickens
v. Kinder." The Pickens court had observed:
Employees who go on strike do not sever their employer-employee relation-
ship, and such relationship continues during the entire time they are on strike
and until such time as they quit or obtain employment elsewhere, and striking
employees who intend to return to their jobs are not totally unemployed
where there is no showing of a separation from employment.'
In overruling the Pickens case, the court relied extensively on the
presumption that the legislature will not enact a meaningless statute." In so
doing, they attempted to show that the per se rule set forth in Pickens was
inconsistent with the disqualification provisions in West Virginia Code sec-
tion 21A-6-3(4). This subsection disqualifies a claimant whose "total or partial
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor
dispute . . . " unless he meets specified criteria." The court noted that if
striking workers cannot be considered totally or partially unemployed, then
subsection 4 would be rendered "pure surplusage."9 9 Subsection 4
represented the product of careful legislative policy-making whereby certain
striking workers -particularly those compelled to strike because of inade-
quate wages and conditions-were found to be deserving of preferential
treatment. As the court concluded: "The legislature, representatives of our
citizens, made these public policy decisions about unemployment benefits for
striking workers and implemented those decisions in this section. We cannot
read this section out of the act by denying eligibility to all striking
workers."'
155 W. Va. 121, 181 S.E.2d 469 (1971).
Id. (syllabus point 3 by the court).
, State ex rel. Hardesty v. Avacoma-Chief Logan No. 4523, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 147
W. Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963).
" W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3 (1981) reads in part:
[A claimant is disqualified for] a week in which his total or partial unemployment is due
to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establish-
ment or other premises at which he was last employed, unless the commissioner is satis-
fied that he was not (one) participating, financing, or directly interested in such dispute,
and (two) did not belong to a grade or class of workers who were participating, financ-
ing, or directly interested in the labor dispute which resulted in the stoppage of work.
No disqualification under this subdivision shall be imposed if the employees are required
to accept wages, hours or conditions of employment substantially less favorable than
those prevailing for similar work in the locality, or if the employees are denied the right
of collective bargaining under generally prevailing conditions, or if an employer shuts
down his plant or operation or dismisses his employees in order to force wage reduction,
changes in hours or working conditions.
305 S.E.2d at 343.
' Id. (emphasis in original).
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The Belt court cannot be said to have accorded Pickens a respectful
burial. However, the plain language of Section 21A-6-3(4) indicates that the
rule established in Pickens -disqualifying all striking workers-was over-
braod and ran contrary to the intent of the Legislature. The impact of the
Belt decision is difficult to gauge at this point. Suffice it to say that the
revitalization of subsection 4 will allow the courts to determine what strikers
meet the statutory requirements for compensation.
The narrow question presented by Farmer v. Cole1' was whether an
employee suspended from work, with reinstatement conditioned on work be-
ing available, is unemployed within the meaning of the West Virginia Code."2
The claimant, Raymond Farmer, was suspended by his employer, with intent
to discharge, for failure to comply with a management order. Farmer filed a
grievance objecting to the attempted discharge and the matter was ulti-
mately submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator found that good cause did not
exist for the dismissal and directed Farmer be returned to work three
months hence, without pay during the suspension period. Farmer then filed
for unemployment compensation benefits for the remainder of the suspension
period. His claim was denied on the ground that he was not "totally or par-
tially unemployed" as defined by the compensation statute."3
In a brief per curiam opinion, the supreme court reversed the ruling
against the claimant as being "plainly wrong."'" The court's analysis
centered exclusively on Kisamore v. Rutledge,"5 which was factually almost
identical to the Farmer case. In Kisamore, an employee 'Was discharged for
disciplinary reasons, and his reinstatement was made conditional on work
being available and his ability to pass a physical examination. The Farmer
court held that Kisamore was controlling: "The crux of the Kisamore ruling
was that reinstatement be conditional and that during the suspension period
the employee perform no services and that no wages be payable to him from
the suspending employer."' Since Farmer's reinstatement was expressly
conditional on "work available," it came within the purview of Kisamore, and
the claimant was entitled to compensation during the suspension period."7
,01 300 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam).
'o Id. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-3 (1981) sets forth definitions for the unemployment compensation
law.
103 W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-1 (1981).
' 300 S.E.2d at 639. The standard of review regarding unemployment cases is as follows:
"Findings of fact by the Board of Review of the West Virginia Department of Employment Secur-
ity, in an unemployment compensation case, should not be set aside unless such findings are
plainly wrong .... " Kisamore v. Rutledge, 276 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1981)(syllabus point 1 by the
court).
105 276 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1981).
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The Farmer decision did not signal an abrupt break with the precedents.
It did, however, clarify the case law regarding eligibility for unemployment
benefits during suspensions, resolving any uncertainty that existed in favor
of claimants.
The state's unemployment compensation statute formerly provided that
where an employee left work "voluntarily" without fault on the part of the
employer, he would be disqualified from receiving benefits for a period of six
successive weeks.' 8 The court had previously held that one who ceases work
because of health-related problems has done so voluntarily, thereby coming
under the statute's disqualification provision.' 9 In Gibson v. Rutlege,"' this
question of statutory construction was addressed anew.
The claimant, Scott Gibson, was seriously injured while working as a
general laborer. He was forced to quit work and recuperate for a period of
seven months under orders from his physician. After he received his physi-
cian's permission to return to work, he learned that he had been relieved by
his employer. Gibson filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits,
which was approved, but he was found ineligible for six weeks because he
had left his employment voluntarily. Gibson then appealed from that portion
of the ruling denying him benefits during the six weeks.
In State v. Hix," the supreme court had defined the word "voluntarily"
as used in the statute to mean "the free exercise of the will."'' Regarding the
eligibility of claimants who quit work due to health-related problems, the Hix
court had held: "[A]n employee who ceases work on account of illness, or fear
of illness, or for any cause not involving fault on the part of his employer, is
not entitled to unemployment benefits for the week following his cessation of
work, and the six weeks immediately following such week.""' In support of
this finding, the court suggested that the legislature had intended to "guard
against the abuses which might arise from permitting employees to volun-
tarily quit work on account of real or fancied ailments, and still be in [a] posi-
tion to apply for and receive benefits .... "I"
The rule adopted in Hix-that one compelled to terminate his employ-
ment for reasons of health has voluntarily quit his job-was expressly over-
ruled in Gibson. The Hix rationale, the court opined, does not do justice to
'' W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(1)(1978) (amended 1981 & 1983).
,G3 State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949), overruled, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982).
,, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982).
' 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949), overruled, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982).
"' 132 W. Va. at 522, 54 S.E.2d at 201.
113 State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949) (syllabus point 2 by the court), overruled,
298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982).
... 132 W. Va. at 523, 54 S.E.2d at 201.
1984]
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 20
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss2/20
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
the beneficient purpose of unemployment compensation. Moreover, Hix
promoted marked inconsistency in eligibility requirements. The commis-
sioner is required to consider an employee's health and fitness in determining
whether available work is suitable for him.11 5 There would be gross inequity
in allowing an unemployed individual to refuse work because of debilitating
health problems, while denying full compensation to one who must quit work
for similar reasons."' In light of these factors, the court adopted a more
lenient view of the term "voluntary," bringing West Virginia in line with the
majority of jurisdictions on this matter.
Gibson fits neatly into the panoply of cases further increasing access to
compensation benefits and reinforcing the viability of the "liberality rule."
While the impact of the decision itself may be slight, its importance lies in
the court's willingness to decide compensation cases with an eye to aiding
future claimants.
James B. Stoneking
15 W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-5 (1981).
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